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TOWARD A LESS BENEVOLENT DESPOTISM:
THE CASE FOR ABOLITION OF
CALIFORNIA'S MDSO LAWS
INTRODUCTION
California's Mentally Disordered Sex Offender laws' can best
be described as Janus-faced. 2 One face looks to the civil struc-
ture of the law and the other to the criminal. The Mentally Dis-
ordered Sex Offender or "MDSO" commitments have been re-
garded by the courts of California as civil proceedings' although
they may only be instituted after a criminal conviction.4 Many
of the requisite due process safeguards afforded to criminal de-
fendants are also afforded to the alleged MDSO. 5 Many how-
ever are not.'
In evaluating MDSO laws the courts have been forced to
strain semantics in order to reconcile the realities of the commit-
ment with its civil appellation. However, newly emerging legal
considerations of right to treatment 7 and recent equal protec-
tion-due process analyses8 have begun to undermine this civil
facade.
1. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-6330 (West 1972). As of July 1,
1973 the Department of Mental Hygiene will be known as the State Depart-
ment of Health. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 4001 (West Supp. 1973).
2. Janus, the Roman god of beginnings, was usually portrayed with two
bearded heads placed back to back. Thus he might look in two directions at
the same time.
3. People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 397 (1957); People v.
Loignon, 250 Cal. App. 2d 386, 58 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1967); People v. Succop,
67 Cal. 2d 785, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1967); People v. Lopez, 1
Cal. App. 3d 672, 82 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1969).
4. In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968);
People v. O'Lea, 17 Cal. App. 3d 834, 95 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1971).
5. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6303 (notification); 6305 (advice
as to allegation and right of reply and production of witnesses-if requested
the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the alleged MDSO); 6318
(right to demand jury trial if found to be MDSO). It is unclear at this time if
an MDSO has a right to a second jury trial, if after spending time at Atascadero
State Hospital, he is sent back to the committing court as still dangerous and
recertified pursuant to section 6325. See People v. Washington, 269 Cal. App.
2d 246, 74 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1969).
6. The jury trial provided under Cal. Welf. & Instns Code §§ 6318, 6321
is trial by civil standards which permits a person to be adjudged an MDSO
by three-quarters of a jury based upon a preponderance of the evidence.
7. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney,
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala., N.D. 1971); Martarella v. Kelley, 41 U.S.L.W. 2230
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1972); In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1971).
8. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1971); Specht v. Patterson,
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If one accepts the premise that these proceedings are in fact
criminal, then their constitutionality becomes suspect particularly
in light of recent cases dealing with cruel and unusual punish-
ment,9 the civil/criminal dichotomy,10 and punishment for sta-
tus.
11
It is the contention of this author that both of the Janus
faces of the MDSO statutes-the civil and the criminal-must
necessarily be deemed unconstitutional. Viewed from either per-
spective the MDSO laws should be abolished. Society's legitimate
interest in protection from sexual offenders would not be com-
promised. The criminal laws and the provisions for civil com-
mitment of imminently dangerous persons under the Lanter-
man-Petris-Short Act'2 offer society ample protection without im-
permissibly infringing on individual constitutional rights.
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In order to relate these emergent constitutional concepts to
the MDSO statutes it is necessary to first look at the development
of the laws regulating and classifying sexual offenders generally
and in California.
In response to pressure exerted upon lawmakers, partially
by medical and legal experts, the California legislature passed a
"Sexual Psychopath Act" in 1939.13 The Act reflected the belief
of certain segments of society that "'criminal behavior, especially
criminal sexual behavior (is) related to mental illness . . .' "I'
and that medicine, in particular psychiatry, would provide the an-
swers to the problems posed by sexual offenders.'"
In 1963, in response to repeated criticisms'" of the use of
386 U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Cross v. Harris,
418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201,
96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
9. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); cf. In re Gary W., 5 Cal.
3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). But see Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1967).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000 et seq. (West 1972).
13. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5500-5516 (Stats. 1937, c.447), as
amended §§ 6300-6330 (West 1972). See also Comment, Sane Laws for Sexual
Psychopaths, 1 STAN. L.R. 486 (1949); Comment, California's Sexual Psycho-
path-Criminal or Patient?, I U.S.F. L.R. 332 (1967).
14. Bowman, Review of Sex Legislation and Control of Sex Offenders in
the United States of America in FINAL REPORT ON CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION
RESEARCH, The Langley Porter Clinic and State of California, Department of Men-
tal Hygiene 15 (1954) [hereinafter cited as BOWMAN].
15. Id.
16. Hacker and Frym, The Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical
Discussion, 43 CAL. L. REV. 766, 768-69 (1955) [hereinafter cited as HACKER].
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the term "sexual psychopath" 17 the legislature enacted section 6300
of the Welfare and Institutions Code which provides that:
As used in this article, "mentally disordered sex of-
fender" means any person who by reason of mental de-
fect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of
sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the
health and safety of others. Wherever the term "sexual
psychopath" is used in any code, such terms shall be con-
strued to refer to and mean a "mentally disordered sex of-
fender."18
The Indeterminate Sentence and
Disordered Sexual Offender Laws
The disposition of the disordered sexual offender has at its
base the concept of an indeterminate sentence,'" which confines
a defendant until such time as he20 is deemed to have received
For a description of the intricate procedural requirements of MDSO proceedings
see CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-6330; see also Comment, The MDSO-
Uncivil Civil Commitment, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 169, 171-73 (1970). The
only substantial change in the procedures outlined in the Comment, supra deals
with § 6316 of the Code which was amended in 1970. The 90 day statutory
observation period formerly required prior to an indeterminate commitment to
the Department of Mental Hygiene was abolished. A person adjudged an
MDSO is immediately committed on an indeterminate sentence to the Depart-
ment.
17. HACKER, supra note 16, at 769-71; S. BRAKEL AND R. RoCK, THE MEN-
TALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 351 (rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
BRACKEL AND ROCK]. The term "sexual psychopath" was criticized as a legal
term having no medical counterpart. It was therefore difficult for testifying psy-
chiatrists to conform their diagnosis to the required legal terminology. It ap-
pears that the term "mentally disordered sex offender" is not appreciably more
precise. Cf. S. POLLACK, THE SEX OFFENDER AND THE LAW 183-88 Institute
of Psychiatry and Law (1972) (unpublished manual prepared for use of faculty
of Institute on The Sex Offender and the Law held at the University of Southern
California School of Medicine, August 19, 1972. The material is considered pre-
liminary.) [hereinafter cited as POLLACK].
18. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6300 (West 1972).
19. Id. § 6316 provides in part:
If, after examination and hearing, the court finds that the person
is a mentally disordered sex offender but will not benefit by care or
treatment in a state hospital the court shall then cause the person to
be returned to the court in which the criminal charge was tried to
await further action with reference to such criminal charge. Such
court shall resume the proceedings and shall impose sentence or make
such other suitable disposition of the case as the court deems neces-
sary. If, however, such court is satisfied that the person is a mentally
disordered sex offender but would not benefit by care or treatment in
a state hospital it may re-certify the person to the superior court of
the county. The superior court may make an order committing the
person for an indefinite period to the Department of Mental Hygiene
for placement in a state institution or institutional unit for the care
and treatment of mentally disordered sex offenders designated by the
court and provided pursuant to Section 6326 (emphasis added).
20. The pronoun "he" is used advisedly. Those adjudged MDSOs are al-
most exclusively male. Of the 3,706 subjects of a study conducted by the
1973]
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optimum benefit from hospitalization and is "not a danger
to the health and safety of others. ' 2t  The indeterminate sen-
tence may continue if he is not amenable to treatment and "still
a danger to the health and safety of others ... .
The standard method of dealing with disordered sexual of-
fenders is the indeterminate sentence until "cure." This method
first appeared in a 1911 Massachusetts law,23 which distinguished
"defective delinquents" as a separate class and provided for their
indeterminate commitment if adjudged either dangerous or tending
to become so. 24  In 1921 New York passed a similar law.25
These early examples were followed by other states in the
1940's, largely in response to public pressure for stronger mea-
sures against sex offenders.20 Much of this pressure stemmed
from the news media.27 Commentators have noted that although
California Bureau of Criminal Statistics between 1966 and 1970, only 7 werefemales. Five of the seven were declared not to be MDSOs; two were de-
clared MDSO and given indeterminate sentences. The Mentally Disordered SexOffender in California, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE 10-
11 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MDSO-STATSTICS, 1972].
21. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6325 (West 1972) provides:
Whenever a person who is committed for an indeterminate periodto the department for placement in a state hospital as a mentally dis-
ordered sex offender (a) has been treated to such an extent that inthe opinion of the superintendent the person will not benefit by further
care and treatment in the hospital and is not a danger to the health
and safety of others, or (b) has not recovered, and in the opinion ofthe superintendent the person is still a danger to the health and safetyof others, the superintendent of the hospital shall file with the com-
mitting court a certification of his opinion under (a) or (b), as the
case may be, including therein a report, diagnosis and recommendation
concerning the person's future care, supervision or treatment. If theopinion so certified is under (a) the committing court shall forthwith
order the return of the person to said committing court and shall there-
after cause the person to be returned to the court in which the criminal
charge was tried to await further action with reference to such criminal
charge.
Such court shall resume the proceedings, upon the return of theperson to the court, and after considering all the evidence before it
may place the person on probation for a period of not less than fiveyears if the criminal charge permits such probation and the person is
otherwise eligible for probation. As a condition of such probationthe person shall totally abstain from the use of alcoholic liquor orbeverages. In any case, where the person is sentenced on a criminal
charge, the time the person spent under indeterminate commitment as
a mentally disordered sex offender shall be credited in fixing his term
of sentence.
The subdivisions, "a" and "b" result in the so-called "A" and "B" ratings given
to a 'patient' returning to court from Atascadero. See People v. Rancier, 240Cal. App. 2d 579, 581, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878 (1966).
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6325 (West 1972).
23. MASS. LAWS ANN., Ch. 123, § 113 (1965).
24. CONFERENCE MANUAL ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE SEXUAL OFFEN-
DER, Boston University Law-Medicine Institute,4 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
BOSTON REPORT]; BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 15.
25. BOWMAN, supra note 14 ,at 15.
26. See BOSTON REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
27. Id.
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there was little increase in sex crimes during the period 1946 to
1950 there was a marked increase in sensational magazine arti-
cles2 8 dealing with the topic.29
This public pressure for greater control of sexual offenders
was countered with medical and legal prodding for treatment
rather than punishment.80  This combination led to the enactment
of special legislation in at least 28 states.3 1  The statutes are all
premised on the notion that psychiatry will in fact be able to iden-
tify, isolate and then treat sexual offenders.3 2  This rationale has
been increasingly challenged33 and has led some observers to
note that there are as many definitions of the sexual offender as
there are laws which attempt to deal with him.34
The sexual offender statutes are of two general types: pre-
conviction" and post-conviction. 30  The trend today is towards
28. Id. at 2-3 citing J. Edgar Hoover, How Safe is Your Daughter, AMERICAN
MAGAZINE, July 1947; David G. Wittels, What Can We Do About Sex Crimes?,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, Dec. 11, 1948; R.C. Walthrop, Murder as a Sex
Practice, AMERICAN MERCURY, February, 1948.
29. BOSTON REPORT, supra note 14, at 2; sec OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST
AND THE LAw 48 (1953).
30. HACKER supra note 16, at 7.
31. BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 17, at 341, 362-73; Comment, supra note
16, at 167-70 n.11; POLLACK, supra note 17, at 147. There is some discrepancy
in the figures cited in BRACKEL AND ROCK and the Comment which have to do
with the repeal of certain statutes and their classificaion. Some authors do
not include post-sentencing transfers of child-molesters, a narrowly drawn law,
in the category of sexual offender laws (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-9
to 22-22-10 (1967)). Additionally, "defective delinquent" acts are sometimes
not included (MD. ANN. CODE ART. 31B (1971)). See also Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d
652 (1970); Comment, 14 BAYLOR L.R. 93 (1962).
32. BRACKEL AND ROCK, supra note 7, at 341.
33. See id. at 348-53; cf. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH.
L.R. 1107 (1972); POLLACK, supra note 17, at 73-74.
34. BRAKEL AND ROCK, supra note 17, at 343. Illustrative are the defini-
tions found in ALA. CODE 15, § 434 (Supp. 1969):
Any person who is suffering from a mental disorder but is not
mentally ill or feebleminded to an extent making him criminally irre-
sponsible for his acts, such mental disorder being coupled with crim-
inal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, is hereby declared
to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person ...
and in ILL. ANN. STAT. 38, § 105-1.01 (Smith Hurd 1970):
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disor-
der has existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately
prior to the filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled
with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and
who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or
acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby declared sexually
dangerous persons.
35. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 15 § 436 (Supp. 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3504
(d)(1); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403; In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 859 n.4,
442 P.2d 679, 682 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 n.4 (1968).
36. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 62-1534 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, § 1 (1965).
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post-conviction statutes, 37 with only one-third of thb 28 states fol-
lowing the pre-conviction model."' The majority of post-convic-
tion statutes apply only to convictions of a sexual crime3" but un-
der some laws, proceedings may be instituted after the convic-
tion of any crime. California is in the latter category. 40  Under
California's MDSO provisions a person may be certified to superior
court after conviction of any crime.4 If he is found to be pre-
disposed to the commission of sexual offenses and dangerous he
may be committed indefinitely to the Department of Mental Hy-
giene 42 and sent to Atascardero State Hospital (which is the hos-
37. Comment, The Validity of the Segregation of the Sexual Psychopath
Under the Law, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 640, 646 (1965). Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code
§ 5501 formerly provided for commitment "when any person is charged with a
crime, either before or after adjudication of the charge," but amended § 6302
provides for commitment only gfter conviction of a crime. (West 1972).
38. BRAKEL AND RocK, supra note 17, at 343.
39. Id. at 344.
40. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302(a) (West 1972).
41. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (West 1972) provides:
(a) When a person is convicted of any criminal offense, whether
or not a sex offense, the trial judge, on his own motion, or on motion
of the prosecuting attorney, or on application by affidavit by or on
behalf of the defendant, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court
that there is probable cause for believing such a person is a mentally
disordered sex offender within the meaning of this chapter, may ad-
journ the proceeding or suspend the sentence, as the case may be, and
may certify the person for hearing and examination by the superior
court of the county to determine whether the person is a mentally
disordered sex offender within the meaning of this article. Convic-
tion upon a charge of violation of Section 290 of the Penal Code by
failure to register as required thereby is conviction of a criminal of-
fense within the meaning of this subdivision.
I (b) Child under 14; misdemeanor. When a person is convicted
of a sex offense involving a child under 14 years of age and it is a
misdemeanor, and the person has been previously convicted of a sex
offense in this or any other state, the court shall adjourn the proceed-
ing or suspend the sentence, as the case may be, and shall certify the
person for hearing and examination by the superior court of the county
to determine whether the person is a mentally disordered sex offender
within the meaning of this article.
(c) Child under 14; felony. When a person is convicted of a
sex offense involving a child under 14 years of age and it is a felony,
the court shall adjourn the proceeding or suspend the sentence, as
the case may be, and shall certify the person for hearing and examina-
tion by the superior court of the county to determine whether the
person is a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of this
article.(d) Ward of court over 16. When a person over the age of 16
years has been found the juvenile court to be a person described
by Section 601 or 602 of this code and adjudged to be a ward of the
court, the juvenile court judge on his own motion, or on motion of
the probation officer, or on application by affidavit by or on behalf of
the ward, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that there is
probable cause for believing such person is a mentally disordered sex
offender within the meaning of this article, may adjourn the proceed-
ing and may certify the person for hearing and examination by the
superior court of the county to determine whether the person is a
mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of this article.
42. Id. § 6316 which provides in part:
If, after examination and hearing, the court finds that the person
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pital for treatment of the criminally insane and sexual offenders
in California).4" Subsequently, if he is found to be not amen-
able to treatment and still dangerous, he may be recertified and
sent to a facility administered by the Department of Corrections
-that is, a prison.44
Significantly, the sexual psychopath statutes are not widely
applied except in California and Wisconsin.45
The Question of Constitutionality
The constitutionality of sexual offender laws has been in-
frequently litigated before the United States Supreme Court.46 The
first challenge to a sexual psychopath statute to reach the Court
was Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,4 7 decided in
1940.
is a mentally disordered sex offender and that the person could bene-
fit by treatment in a state hospital, the court in its discretion has the
alternative to return the person to the criminal court for further dis-
position or may make an order committing the person to the depart-
ment for placement in a state hospital for an indeterminate period ...
43. Information About Department of Mental Hygiene-Programs-Ad-
missions-Hospitals-Local Programs 16 DEPT. OF MENTAL HYGIENE (undated
pamphlet). Of the 464 "sex offenders" admitted to hospitals under the aegis
of the Department of Mental Hygiene during the 1971-72 fiscal year, 446 went
to Atascadero. Between July 1, 1972 and Feb. 28, 1973, 301 of the 319 "sex
offenders" committed were sent to Atascadero. Letter from Department of
Health-Program Analysis and Statistics Section, April 6, 1973.
44. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6316 (West 1972). See note 19 supra.
Section 6326 provides in part:
Facilities for custodial care and treatment. The Director of Men-
tal Hygiene, with the approval of the Director of Corrections and the
Director of Finance, may provide on the grounds of a state institution
or institutions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections
or the Department of Mental Hygiene one or more institutional units
to be used for the custodial care and treatment of mentally disordered
sex offenders. Each such unit shall be administered in the manner
provided by law for the government of the institution in which such
unit is established (emphasis added).
45. Comment, supra note 36, at 656; Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes:
Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 215, 225 (1961).
46. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), where Justice Blackmun
notes, "Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable
that the substantive consitutional limitations on this power have not been more
frequently litigated." Supra at 737 (footnotes omitted). "This power" to which
the Court refers, is the power to commit persons found to be mentally ill either
through civil commitment, sexual psychopath laws, defective delinquent laws, or
procedures instituted after a person is found not guilty by reason of insanity;
Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 ABAJ 1059, 1063 (1972).
47. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
The Supreme Court found the Minnesota statute consitutional based upon the
limiting construction given to it by the Minnesota Supreme Court:
Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably
be said that the language of § 1 of the act is intended to include those
persons who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,
have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses
and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury,
19731
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In 1951, Pearson was found controlling in a constitutional
challenge to California's Sexual Psychopath Act.48 Considering
the abundance of appellate court challenges 40 to MDSO proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court of California has reviewed these laws
relatively infrequently and usually on procedural technicalities.5"
loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and un-
controllable desire. It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions
of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even
to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would
not only make the act impracticable of enforcement and, perhaps,
unconstitutional in its application, but would also be an unwarranted
departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined.
Id. at 273, citing State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 555,
287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939) (emphasis added).
48. In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951). In his
opinion, Judge (now Justice) McComb made no attempt to distinguish Pearson
or explain why it was controlling. The requirement in Pearson of "an habitual
course of misconduct in sexual matters" and the need to "have evidenced an
utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses" was totally absent in the
California statute. That plus the large number of "first-time" offenders adjudi-
cated MDSO [68.6% had no previous sexual offense record-MDSO-STAnsncs,
1972 at 27] would seem to have required a different decision in Keddy and the
lack of analysis is therefore disturbing. Having summarily dismissed the con-
stitutional challenge, the court addressed the question of whether or not the de-
fendant was entitled to bail pending sexual psychopath hearings, a question it
answered affirmatively. In re Keddy, supra at 218. See generally Note, 30
Cm. KENT L.R. 160 (1951); Note, 31 NEB. L.R. 95 (1951).
49. See, e.g., People v. Harvath, 251 Cal. App. 2d 780, 60 Cal. Rptr. 15
(1967); People v. McDonald, 257 Cal. App. 2d 846, 65 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1968);
People v. Slutts, 259 Cal. App. 2d 886, 66 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1968) which have
attacked the MDSO proceeding because of some irregularity in the complex
commitment procedures. Other cases are currently attacking the failure of the
statutes to require a unanimous jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Burnick, 27 Cal. App. 3d 326, 103 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1972) hearing
granted, Crim. No. 16554, Oct. 12, 1972, argued, Jan. 11, 1973; People v.
Bonneville, 29 Cal. App. 3d 317, 105 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1972) hearing granted,
Crim. No. 16777, March 1, 1973.
50. This author has found the following cases which have been heard by
the California Supreme Court regarding MDSO proceedings: People v. Barnett,
27 Cal. 2d 649, 166 P.2d 4 (1946) (the trial court abused its discretion in not
allowing accused a hearing on his status as a sex psychopath); People v.
McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P.2d 913 (1952) (the statutory proceeding is
applicable regardless of the nature of the underlying crime; the primary purpose
of the law is protection of society and it is a civil proceeding); People v. Hower-
ton, 40 Cal. 2d 217, 253 P.2d 8 (1953) (nothing done in a sex psychopath
hearing can modify original conviction); Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d
816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954) (an appeal may be taken from an order of commit-
ment); People v. Gross, 44 Cal. 2d 859, 285 P.2d 630 (1955) (all subsequent
commitment orders are also appealable); Thurmond v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 17, 314 P.2d 6 (1957) (commitment as a sex psychopath does not preclude
new trial on original charge); People v. Jackson, 59 Cal. 2d 375, 379 P.2d 937,
29 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1963) (the court was not required to give a sua sponte
instruction on the law relating to confinement of sexual psychopaths in a
murder case); People v. Westbrook, 62 Cal. 2d 197, 397 P.2d 545, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 809 (1964) (the trial court abused its discretion in not considering MDSO
proceedings where defendant's record demonstrated he was a sex psychopath al-
though he was convicted of a crime which was not sexual); People v. Failla,
64 Cal. 2d 560, 414 P.2d 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1966) (a defendant with two
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In the last five years the California court has heard only four
MDSO cases, 51 two of which were decided on technical points. 52
In re BevillS5 -the traditional view
The California Supreme Court last addressed itself to the is-
sue of the nature of MDSO proceedings in 1968.11 Guy Earl
Bevill was confined at San Quentin on an indeterminate commit-
ment as an MDSO after having spent two years at Atascadero State
Hospital. The superintendent of Atascadero had given Bevill
a "B" rating,16 which signified that he would no longer benefit
from treatment but that he remained a danger to society. By
writ of habeas corpus Bevill sought to attack not his commit-
ment, but the underlying criminal conviction. 56 He contended
prior felonies was ineligible for probation and thus not eligible for MDSO pro-
ceedings); In re Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 224, 418 P.2d 6, 53 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1966)
(a person committed to prison as an MDSO has a right to have all other out-
standing convictions reduced to judgment so that time may be served concur-
rently); People v. Foster, 67 Cal. 2d 604, 432 P.2d 976, 63 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1967) (defendant was illegally committed as an MDSO because he had been
ineligible for probation); In re Wells, 67 Cal. 2d 873, 434 P.2d 613, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 317 (1967) (procedural questions dealing with the failure of the trial court
to certify defendant to the superior court--case mooted due to change in the
statute); People v. Succop, 67 Cal. 2d 785, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 983 (1967) (reversal of order of commitment for
failure of the court to advise defendant of his right to reply and produce wit-
nesses; this was not a moot point, as one is entitled to clear his name after an
illegal adjudication as an MDSO); In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679,
69 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968) (a defendant may attack his underlying criminal
conviction, and if that conviction falls the entire MDSO proceeding also fails);
People v. Kellum, 71 Cal. 2d 352, 455 P.2d 429, 78 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1969)
(application of the Escobedo-Dorado rule when entry of the final judgment was
deferred until June 22, 1964); In re Lopez, 3 Cal. 3d 147, 474 P.2d 430, 89
Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970) (defendant does fall under Penal Code § 4502 (weapon in
prison), although confined within San Quentin as an MDSO. Section 6700.5 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code does not apply); People v. Burnick, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 326, 103 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1972) hearing granted, Crim. No. 16554,
Oct. 12, 1972, argued, Jan. 11, 1973 (do MDSO proceedings require a standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?).
51. In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968);
People v. Kellum, 71 Cal. 2d 352, 455 P.2d 429, 78 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1969); In
re Lopez, 3 Cal. 3d 147, 474 P.2d 430, 89 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970); People v.
Burnick, 27 Cal. App. 3d 326, 103 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1972) hearing granted, Crim.
No. 16554, Oct. 12, 1972, argued Jan. 11, 1973.
52. People v. Kellum, 71 Cal. 2d 352, 455 P.2d 429, 78 Cal. Rptr. 501
(1969); In re Lopez, 3 Cal. 3d 147, 474 P.2d 430, 89 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1970).
53. In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968).
54. Id.
55. See note 21 supra.
56. Bevill was found guilty of a violation of Penal Code § 650 which
provides in part:
A person who wilfully and wrongfully commits any act * * * which
seriously disturbs or endangers the public peace or health, or which
openly outrages public decency * * * for which no other punishment
is expressly prescribed by this code, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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that if the underlying conviction was invalid the entire MDSO com-
mitment procedure must fall as it had to be predicated on a valid
criminal conviction.17  The pivotal question in the case was
whether "a person confined as a mentally disordered sex of-
fender may challenge the validity of his criminal conviction on
habeas corpus."58  The court answered this query affirmatively,
and in the process reiterated, without discussion, the accepted no-
tions about the nature of MDSO proceedings:
[1] A person committed as a mentally disordered sex of-
fender is not confined for the criminal offense but be-
cause of his status as a mentally disorded sex offender. 9
[2] The confinement is pursuant to a law the primary pur-
pose of which is protection of society.60
[3] While a person is under such commitment, the criminal
case against him is suspended. When the proceedings
relating to commitment as a mentally disordered sex
offender have run their course, the criminal case may
be resumed and sentence imposed.61
[4] Habeas corpus is appropriate to challenge the validity of
a person's commitment or continued confinement as a
mentally disordered sex offender.62
[5] The mentally disorded sex offender is not legally in-
sane. . .; he is not even necessarily a 'sex offender' be-
cause the crime of which he is convicted need not be
a sex offense.63
The court went on to discuss the possible disabilities faced
by an MDSO, and commented that if ". . . the rehabilitative
ideal fail(s) of fruition, he faces life imprisonment in a penal
institution." ' 4
Bevill thus articulated the state of the law in California in
1968. The MDSO laws and the premises which underlie them
have not been directly challenged until this term.65 Thus the
Actually he had been arrested for engaging in an act of masturbation in front of
two children. The court decided that his conviction was invalid as § 650
applies only to acts "for which no other punishment is expressly prescribed in
this code." CAL. PEN. CODE § 650 (West 1972). Bevill's alleged conduct
clearly brought him under Penal Code § 314(1), relating to indecent exposure.
57. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (West 1972); See note 41 supra
and accompanying text; In re Stoneham, 232 Cal. App. 2d 337, 340-41, 42
Cal. Rptr. 741, 742-43 (1965).
58. 68 Cal. 2d at 857-58, 442 P.2d at 681-82, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
59. Id. at 858, 442 P.2d at 681, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 860, 442 P.2d at 682, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
64. Id. at 861, 442 P.2d at 683, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
65. The only exception to this is dicta appearing in People v. Maugh, 1
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court has not addressed itself to recent developments in constitu-
tional law which tend to undermine the conceptual foundation of
California's MDSO statutes. However, it has considered these
developments in cases analogous to MDSO challenges, and these
cases may be seen as mounting an indirect assault on the validity
of the MDSO proceeding itself.
II. THE INDIRECT ASSAULT
In re Gary W. 6 -- the emerging view
Gary W. was a ward of the California Youth Authority, hav-
ing been committed to the Authority by the juvenile court af-
ter a finding that he had molested a child.67  He was entitled
to a mandatory discharge at the end of two years or on his twenty-
first birthday, whichever occurred later. 8  However, the Youth
Authority filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code Sec-
tion 18009 alleging that Gary's release would endanger the pub-
lic. They requested a two-year extension of his commitment and
after a hearing at which both Gary and the Authority presented
evidence as to his "dangerousness," he was adjudged still a ward
of the court and subject to control of the Authority.
Cal. App. 3d 856, 82 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1969) where the court denominates
MDSO proceedings as similar to criminal prosecutions, requiring criminal due
process standards. Id. at 864, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
66. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
67. CAL. WELF. AND INST'NS CODE § 602 (West 1972) provides:
Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of
this State or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or
county of this State defining crime or who, after having been found by
the juvenile court to be a person described by Section 601, fails to obey
any lawful order of the juvenile court, is within the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the
court.
68. Id. § 1769 provides:
Every person committed to the authority by a juvenile court shall
be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or
when the person reaches his 21st birthday, whichever occurs later, un-
less an order for further detention has been made by the committing
court pursuant to Article 6 (commencing with Section 1800).
69. Id. § 1800 provides:
Whenever the Youth Authority Board determines that the dis-
charge of a person from the control of the Youth Authority at the
time required by Section 1769, 1770, 1770.1, or 1771, as applicable,
would be physically dangerous to the public because of the person's
mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, the board,
through its chairman, shall make application to the committing court
for an order directing that the person remain subject to the control of
the authority beyond such time. The application shall be filed at
least 90 days before the time of discharge otherwise required. The
application shall be accompanied by a written statement of the facts
upon which the board bases its opinion that discharge from control of
the Youth Authority at the time stated would be physically dangerous
to the public, but no such application shall be dismissed nor shall an
order be denied merely because of technical defects in the application.
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Although this was not an MDSO case the challenges made
to these proceedings are important to our discussion. They were
essentially three-fold: 1) Gary contended that he was being pun-
ished for his alleged status of "dangerousness" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 6 of the California Constitution;70 2) he claimed that he
was denied treatment; 71 and 3) he alleged that failure to afford him
a jury trial denied him due process and equal protection of the
laws. 72
Status-The court quickly dismissed Gary's status argument but
the distinctions drawn were quite revealing. The court saw the
issue as whether the statutory scheme in question " 'imprisons'
petitioner 'as a criminal' [which would amount to imprison-
ment for status], or constitutes 'compulsory treatment' of peti-
tioner as a sick person requiring 'periods of involuntary confine-
ment.' -73 The court looked to the legislative language of section
180 17 and concluded that confinement was for the purpose of
treatment. In fact, the court noted that the Youth Authority was
under an affirmative duty to provide treatment and "(i)f the
cause is not a physical or mental condition or the condition is not
amenable to treatment, the Youth Authority may not extend its
control over the ward pursuant to sections 1800-1803."7
Because sections 1800-1803 served a "demonstrably civil pur-
pose" and there was no evidence that persons so committed were
included among the general prison population or were confined
without treatment, the court did not believe that Gary's confine-
ment constituted punishment for status within the constitu-
tional definition. 76
70. 5 Cal. 3d at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
71. Id. at 302, 486 P.2d at 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
72. id. at 303-08, 486 P.2d at 1206-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6-10.
73. Id. at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 5 citing In re De La 0,
59 Cal. 2d 128, 136, 378 P.2d 793, 798, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, 494 (1963).
74. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 1801 provides in part:
If after a full hearing the court is of the opinion that discharge of
the person would be physically dangerous to the public because of his
mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality the court shall
order the Youth Authority to continue the treatment of such person.
If the court is of the opinion that discharge of the person from con-
tinued control of the authority would not be physically dangerous to
the public, the court shall order the person to be discharged from con-
trol of the authority. (emphasis added).
75. 5 Cal. 3d at 302, 486 P.2d at 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6. In a footnote
the court emphasized that it was not, however, suggesting freedom for "dan-
gerous" individuals and it suggested other possible restraint techniques such as
the use of Welfare and Institutions Code § 1780 (commitment of dangerous
ward to state prison if period of control does not equal more than the term for
the offense); § 5000 et seq. (detention and certification for involuntary treat-
ment of imminently dangerous persons); § 6300 et seq. (commitment as
MDSO).
76. Id. Under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the United
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Right to Treatment-Although Gary was able to substantiate his
charge that he was "warehoused" at Atascadero," the court side-
stepped the issue of his right to treatment by granting relief based
on his due process-equal protection contention. The court stated
that a habeas corpus procedure was available to secure the release
of any individual who was denied treatment.78  However, it failed
to note that this procedure will not secitre the release of others
similarly denied treatment.
The lack of efficacy of a single habeas corpus petition re-
minds one of the reasons for the growth of "the fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine. ' 79 It first was argued that an aggrieved defend-
ant's fourth amendment rights could be sufficiently assuaged by a
civil suit for damages against the offending officers."s The
tainted evidence was still admissible; the civil suits were notably
unsuccessful; 8s and police misconduct was encouraged. 2 The
United.States Supreme Court realized the fallacy of effectively con-
doning this official illegal behavior 83 by relegating the injured
party to an inadequate remedy. In much the same way, the
failure of the Youth Authority to meet its "affirmative duty to
provide treatment" 4 cannot be cured by each individual ward's
habeas corpus petition. In both situations, any injured party's
rights can be vindicated, but neither civil suit nor habeas corpus
reaches the core of the problem-illegal official behavior and the
attendant burden on the recipients of such behavior.
Perhaps as one commentator has suggested, the solution to
inadequate or non-existent treatment is the release of all persons
so incarcerated as the only effective method of forcing the state
States Supreme Court precluded imprisonment for the status of narcotics addic-
tion.
77. 5 Cal. 3d at 302, 486 P.2d at 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
78. In another, and arguably similar situation, the court has found that habeas
corpus is not a sufficient remedy to insure the constitutional safeguards of those
committed as incompetent to stand trial. PEN. CODE § 1368 (West 1970). in re
Davis, 8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1973). As with
incompetents, MDSOs are committed because of an alleged "mental defect,
disease, or disorder" and as such may not be able to shoulder the "burden of
initiating proceedings to secure their freedom." Id. at 806-07, n.6.79. See Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (first used the phrase "fruit of
the poisonous tree").
80. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); But see 338 U.S. 25, 40 (dis-
senting opinion).
81. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) citing People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d:434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955).
82. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
83. Id. "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure
to observe its own laws, or worse its disregard of the charter of its own exist-
ence." 367 U.S. at 659.
84. 5 Cal. 3d at 302, 486 P.2d at 1206, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
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to meet the standards of medical treatment which due process re-
quires. 85
Right to a Jury Trial-Due Process and Equal .Protection-The
court carefully analyzed other statutes dealing with the invol-
untary commitment of "dangerous" persons.80 In these statutes
the legislature extended the right to jury trial to other classes
of persons subject to involuntary civil commitment. Implicit in the
legislation was a recognition of the fundamental right of trial by
jury absent a compelling state interest in denying such a trial.8 7
The court found no such compelling state interest in Section
1800. It therefore held that the denial of jury trial in section
1800 proceedings violated both due process of law and equal pro-
tection of the law.88 Citing Baxstrom v. Herold0 the court con-
cluded that "(t)he state having made jury trial on the issue of
status a prerequisite to commitment 'generally available . . . may
not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.' ,0
Deeming Gary's position must closely analogous to that of an
MDSO or a narcotics addict,0 ' the court held that he was entitled
to a jury trial similar to the one afforded to those classes. 2  In
both proceedings, that right is to a civil jury trial.
Thus Gary W. expresses the view that when a fundamental
interest, a person's liberty, is in question, it is irrelevant what
nomenclature is attached to the proceeding. It has been clearly
and unequivocally recognized that
the interests involved in civil commitment proceedings are no
less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings and that
liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil pro-
ceeding than when taken as a consequence of a criminal con-
viction. 93
The California Supreme Court thus provides a significant
85. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 ABAJ 499, 503 (1960). This
would, of course, require the use of class actions in the area of involuntary
commitments.
86. 5 Cal. 3d at 307, 486 P.2d at 1209-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9-10.
87. For a discussion of Gary W's application to the commitment of the
mentally retarded, the only other classification which is denied the right to a
jury trial, see Kay, Famham, Karren, Krakal, Diamond, Legal Planning for the
Mentally Retarded: The California Experience, 60 CAL. L.R. 438, 522-23 (1972).
88. 5 Cal. 3d at 303-08, 486 P.2d at 1206-10, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 6-10.
89. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
90. 5 Cal. 3d at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10, citing Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
91. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE §§ 3050, 3051, 3108 (West
1972).
92. 5 Cal. 3d at 308, 486 P.2d at 1210, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
93. Id. at 307, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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weapon in the attack on the limitations imposed by the civil
appellation of MDSO procedures.
In re Lynch 9-a new look at cruel and unusual punishment
Another case which may well lay the groundwork for a di-
rect assault on the MDSO statutes was decided in December, 1972
by the California Supreme Court. In In re Lynch, the petitioner
was convicted of a violation of Penal Code Section 314, indecent
exposure. As this was a second conviction for indecent exposure,
it was charged as a felony.95 The court found that a potential life
sentence for this offense constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment under Article I, Section 6 of the California Constitution. In
doing so, it examined three rationales: 1) comparative offenses
2) preventive detention and 3) the rule of proportionality.
Comparative Offenses-One of Lynch's applicable rationales was
to look within the "same jurisdiction for different offenses"9 6 which
though more serious in nature are punished less severely. There
are numerous crimes which are considered far more dangerous
than those which underlie the MDSO commitment, and yet carry
potentially lower sentences.97
Another closely related rationale utilized by the court was
94. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, Sup., 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1972).
95. Id. at 413, 503 P.2d at 922, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 218. Lynch was con-
victed of violation of Penal Code § 314 (West 1972) (Indecent Exposure).
As this was a second offense he fell under paragraph 2 of the Code which
stipulates that:
Upon the second and each subsequent conviction under subdivision
1 of this section, or upon a first conviction under subdivision I of this
section after a previous conviction under Section 288 of this code [lewd
or lascivious acts upon a child], every person so convicted is guilty of a
felony, and is punishable by imprisonment in state prison for not less
than one year.
96. Id. at 426, 503 P.2d at 931, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
97. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 193, 204, 208 (West 1972) (manslaugh-
ter-up to 15 years; mayhem-up to 14 years; kidnapping-I to 25 years).
The ultimate seriousness of an MDSO commitment was made explicit by the
court in In re Kramer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 287, 291, 64 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689
(1967):
Courts and attorneys must recognize that sex psychopathy proceed-
ings may have consequences much more serious than the prison term
prescribed in the Penal Code. If the court finds the person is a dan-
ger to others but will not benefit by treatment in a state hospital, the
court may, in its discretion, commit him for placement in an institu-
tion under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (i.e., a
state prison), there to remain until 'he is no longer a danger to others.
For a prisoner who has been officially declared to be both dangerous
and not treatable, the prospects of proving a recovery are bleak. The
practical effect of the civil commitment may be life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. A decision to impose such a commit-
ment should be arrived at only after proceedings which are appropri-
ate to the gravity of the issue. (emphasis added).
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to examine the ways in which other jurisdictions have dealt with
the same offense. As noted earlier, unlike other states California
seems to be particularly preoccupied with commitment of men-
tally disordered sexual offenders."
Following the.analysis in Lynch, a person convicted of in-
decent exposure, an offense with a maximum six-month sentence,
may have his criminal disposition suspended and be certified to
superior court as a potential MDSO. He then faces a possible in-
determinate sentence of life imprisonment under the guise of
"treatment" in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Mr.
Lynch was fortunate-he was sent to prison as a time server.
Had he been adjudged an MDSO he might still be there!9
Preventive Detention-The court's analysis in Lynch did not stop
with comparing offenses, but proceeded to answer several con-
tentions raised by the Attorney General. The court's language
bears directly on the underlying rationale of any predictive
law which, like MDSO proceedings attempts to predict future
behavior. The court noted that the possibility of recidivism will
not justify a pro tanto repeal of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.' 0 Nor, in the case of indecent exposure, does a second of-
fense validate "greatly enhanced punishment."'' In reply to the
allegation that exhibitionists move on to more aggressive acts, the
court concluded that "this risk appears to be mere fantasy. "102
In the case of MDSOs it is unclear what criteria are ultilized
to demonstrate a predisposition to the commission of sexual of-
fenses. Certainly it is not their past criminal record. Between
1966 and 1970, 66% of all referrals had no prior sexual offense
record and 68.6% of those who received indeterminate commit-
ments had no such previous record.'' Considering the large
percentage of "first-time offenders" it is difficult to understand
the criteria used to find them "predisposed" to the commitment
of sexual crimes.
98. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. Even in 1950 there had
been more people committed as sex psychopaths in California than any other
state. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEX CRIMES OF THE
ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES
47 (1950).
99. Mr. Lynch, even after only one conviction, could have been adjudicated
an MDSO and might still be facing life imprisonment.
100. 8 Cal. 3d at 432, 503 P.2d at 936, 105 Cal. Rptr. 232.
101. Id. at 433, 503 P.2d at 936, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
102. Id. Cf. HACKER, supra note 16 at 771-72; A. ELLIS AND R. BRANCALE,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS 32-33 (1956); L. Burick, Analysis of the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Person's Act, 59 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 254 (1968).
See also L. Frisbie and E. Dondis, Recidivism Among Treated Sex Offenders,
5 CAL. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 80-90 (1965).
103. MDSO-STAnSTICS, 1972, supra note 20 at 27.
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Thus if even actual recidivism is insufficient, as in Lynch, a
mere prediction of future behavior must fall; particularly in light
of the unreliability of psychiatric predictions. 104
The Rule of Proportionality-Although the court in Lynch care-
fully limited its holding to the "particular indeterminant sentence
imposed . . .," its language indicates a broader application.
After examining the state of the law regarding cruel and unusual
punishments, the court concluded that
in California a punishment violates Article I, Section 6, of the
Constitution if, although not cruel and unusual in its method,
it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it was in-
flicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity. 10 6
The court thus announced a "rule of proportionality." A check-
list was set forth to aid in delineating and applying this rule in
regard to any particular sentence. The critiera deemed notable
included the following:
(1) Are the nature and circumstances of the offense ordin-
ary?
(2) Are the facts of the offense trivial?
(3) Is the impact of the offense violent?
(4) Are the controlling factors of the offense aggravated?
(5) Is the gravity of the offense sufficient?
(6) Is the offender dangerous?
(7) Do the characteristics of the offender mitigate the
crime?1 07
The analogy between Lynch and an attack on MDSO com-
mitments is even closer than that of In re Gary W. Lynch, after
all, was a convicted sexual offender who, either by chance or
design, escaped the doubtful benefits of the MDSO proceeding
and remained within the criminal process. The reasoning in
Lynch ought therefore to apply particularly when read with Gary
W's admonition that nomenclature is irrelevant. The "check-
list" in Lynch demonstrates that a possible life sentence is dispro-
portionate to the crime and, if the civil appellation does not
control, is clearly cruel and unusual punishment.
The Misdemeanant MDSO-Several of the underlying crimes which
trigger commitment as an MDSO are passive misdemeanors with
maximum terms of six months in county jail.
104. Even those psychiatrists who espouse forensic psychiatry recognize the
difficulty in predicting future dangerousness and its potential for gross error.
POLLACK, supra note 17 at 73; See L. Frisbie, Another Look at Sex Offenders in
California, 12 CAL. MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 235 (1969).
105. 8 Cal. 3d at 415, 503 P.2d at 924, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
106. Id. at 424, 503 P.2d at 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
107. Id. at 425-26, 503 P.2d at 930-31, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
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Of the 2,869 offenders who were referred to the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene between 1966 and 1970, 683 were con-
victed of a crime in muncipal and justice courts and 2,186 in
superior court.' Of the 683 lower court referrals 537 (79%)
were given indeterminate commitments. 109
According to the study, of those convicted of the crimes of
indecent exposure'" and annoying children,"' both misdemean-
ors, 42 were initially considered MDSOs but not amenable to
treatment and of those 19 (45.2%) were sent to prison." 2 Of the
35 who received treatment and were subsequently rated as still
dangerous 13 (37.1%) went to prison."113
The significance of the fact that these misdemeanants were
sent to prison as opposed to being placed on probation or sent
to county jail is that their prison sentence could only have re-
sulted from re-certification as an MDSO. It has been noted that
it is often the misdemeanant rather than the felon who is sub-
jected to recommitment." 4
The judge in this type of case faces a dilemma. He has three
choices open to him when faced with an MDSO who is sent back
to court as not amenable to treatment and dangerous: 1) he
can sentence him on the criminal conviction,'" 2) he can grant
probation" 0 or 3) he can re-certify him to superior court pursu-
ant to Section 6326,11 which sets in motion the hearing proced-
ure to re-adjudicate him an MDSO.
The maximum sentence which can be imposed for indecent
exposure or annoying children is six months in the county jail."'
Often a judge is reluctant to risk having a person who has been
labeled "dangerous" by the superintendent at Atascadero at large
in the community that soon. The onus for any subsequent acts by
108. MDSO-STATISTICS, 1972, supra note 20 at iv.
109. Id. at 6. Only 65% of superior court defendants were given indeter-
minate sentence.
110. CAL. PEN. CODE § 314 (West 1972).
111. Id. § 647a.
112. MDSO-STATISTICS, 1972, supra note 20 at 42.
113. Id.
114. Address by The Hon. R. Donald Chapman, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Court, San Jose, California to The Second Annual Meeting of the
American Association for the Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization,
Inc., October 21, 1972. [hereinafter cited as CHAPMAN]. See also MDSO-
STATISTICS, 1972, supra note 20 at vi where it is noted that a "much higher pro-
portion of lower court defendants [are] treated at Mental Hygiene and Correc-
tional facilities, 19 percent, than of the superior court defendants, 7 percent."
115. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6316 (West 1972). See note 19 supra.
116. Id. § 6325. See note 22supra.
117. Id. § 6316. See note 19 supra. Id. § 6326. See note 43 supra.
118. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 314, 647a (West 1972). These code sections pro-
vide for a 6 month sentence and/or a fine not to exceed $500.
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this person may, in the judge's opinion, fall on his shoulders.
Both statistics and cases appear to bear out the observation that
it is more often the misdemeanant than the felon who is subjected
to an indeterminate recommitment to a penal institution. 119 The
felon is usually sentenced on his original criminal charge and pro-
cessed as a "regular" prisoner within the Department of Correc-
tions. 120
III. THE DIRECT ASSAULT
The California Supreme Court in Lynch and in Gary W. has
laid the foundation for a direct assault on MDSO commitments,
especially in view of several United States Supreme Court and fed-
eral district court decisions. This assault has in fact been mounted
but whether or not it will succeed has yet to be determined. The
MDSO procedure is open to attack on at least five grounds. If
the civil appellation is reaffirmed, the statute nevertheless denies
both equal protection of the laws and the right to treatment. If
the essential criminal nature of the proceeding is recognized then
the statute is unconstitutional because it punishes for status, im-
poses cruel and unusual punishment and denies due process of
law.
MDSO-unconstitutional civil commitment
Even viewed civilly, the MDSO proceedings fail to meet the
constitutional requirements of equal protection of the laws. Fol-
lowing the reasoning in Gary W., 12' it is necessary to juxtapose
the MDSO procedure with other involuntary civil commitment
procedures.
119. See MDSO-STAIs-ncs, 1972 at 41-46 (the difficulty with these statis-
tics is that felony dispositions are not broken down into those who were subse-
quently sent to prison on their original felony charge, as is often the case, and
those who went to prison on an MDSO commitment; additionally, the dis-
positions of the 901 persons who were committed to Atascadero based upon
convictions of non-sex crimes were not recorded); People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App.
2d 460, 311 P.2d 397 (1957); People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1966); People v. Succop, 67 Cal. 2d 785, 433 P.2d 473, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1967); In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal. Rptr. 599
(1968); In re Krieger, 272 Cal. App. 2d 885, 77 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1969); In re
Brown, 275 Cal. App. 2d 537, 79 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969); People v. Ruiz, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 992, 82 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1971); In re Acosta, 21 Cal. App. 3d 51,
98 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1971) (In all of these cases defendants were initially con-
victed of misdemeanors, and after being returned as not amenable to treatment
were placed in prison facilities). See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
120. CHAPMAN, supra note 114.
121. 5 Cal. 3d at 307, 486 P.2d at 1209, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 9. See In re
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 135, 496 P.2d 465, 470, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558
(1972).
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There is no rational reason to distinguish a disordered sex
offender commitment from that of involuntary civil commitment
of imminently dangerous persons under the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act 22 (LPS). Under the LPS Act, California's civil com-
mitment statute,'28 a person may be committed for post-certifi-
cation confinement as an "imminently dangerous person." How-
ever, such confinement may only be pursuant to a decision arrived
at by a unanimous jury.'24
While the overall concern is with the mentally ill, the LPS
description requires a person to have "threatened, attempted, or
inflicted physical harm upon the person of another. . . and who,
as a result of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of sub-
stantial physicial harm to others."' 28  The MDSO description
refers to "any person who by reason of mental defect, disease, or
disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to
such a degree that he is dangerous .. . ."" The distinction
is therefore, that the MDSO classification is for potential sexual
dangerousness even previous to any overt act, while LPS only
includes persons who have threatened, attempted or inflicted phy-
sical harm. Because LPS has a unanimity requirement, it is logi-
cally inconsistent that the MDSO statute require only a three-
quarters jury verdict. The three-quarters jury requirement of the
MDSO statute is less restrictive than the unanimity requirement
under LPS and thus the state has discriminated against the allegedly
sexually dangerous. This discrimination is invidious under Ar-
ticle I, Sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A
similar argument may also be made as to the standard of proof re-
quired as confinement under LPS must be made in accordance
with the "constitutional guarantees of due process of law and
procedures required under Section 13 of Article 1 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of California."' 2 7
122. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5303 (West 1972).
123. Id. § 5300 et seq. (West 1972).
124. Id. § 5303.
125. Id. § 5300.
126. Id. § 6300.
127. It is not clear what is the burden of proof under section 5303 of the
LPS Act. There do not appear to be any appellate cases in which it has beenjudicially interpreted. Although "civil commitment" statutes have generally re-
quired merely a civil standard of proof, the wording of section 5303 indicates a
different legislative intent. It is the only section of LPS which explicitly re-
quires an unanimous jury and the only section to reference due process safe-
guards to Article 1, Section 13 of the California Constitution. Article 1, Sec-
tion 13 refers to criminal cases and requires that no person be deprived of
liberty without due process of law. Traditionally criminal due process has re-
quired proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As the California Supreme Court noted
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Of course, a determination that a classification is invidious
because it denies a fundamental right to a distinct class does not
end the inquiry. The state may show that its interest is compelling
and that it has no narrower tool to accomplish its purpose.
128
In the case of MDSO commitments however, the state cannot
even demonstrate a mere rational relationship between the
classification and the purpose.
The argument that the MDSO is a distinct and special class
from the generally dangerous because they are "predisposed to
the commission of sexual offenses," was effectively laid to rest
in Humphrey v. Cady.129  In comparing Wisconsin's Mental Health
Act, 130 the equivalent of LPS, with its Sex Crimes Act"' the
Court noted that these statutes were not mutually exclusive and
that the mental state warranting commitment under the sexual psy-
chopath statute might also warrant commitment under the civil
statute.132 Justice Marshall in Cady found that the equal protection
argument would be "especially persuasive" if it were determined
that the deprivation of procedural protections rested on the arbi-
trary decision of the state to pursue commitment under one stat-
ute instead 'of the other.' 3 3  Further, in Baxstrom v. Herold,1
8 4
the United States Supreme Court held that
[e]lassification of mentally ill persons as either insane or
dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction
for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical
care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the
context of the opportunity to show whether a person is men-
tally ill at all.135
Similarly, the classification as sexually dangerous may be import-
ant for treatment but ought not to control the original proced-
ures for commitment.
Given neither a compelling state interest in making the dis-
tinction between MDSOs and those committed under LPS, nor even
in a recent case, under Evidence Code § 115, "'Except as otherwise provided
by law the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.'"
In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 148, 496 P.2d 465, 479, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 567
(1972). Section 5303 does provide by law by reference to Article 1, Section 13.
The legislative intent in drafting section 5303 would appear therefore to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
128. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1971).
130. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.02(5), 51.03 (1957); § 51.75 Art. II(f) (Supp.
1971).
131. Id. § 959.15 (1958) as amended WIs. STAT. ANN. c. 975 (1971).
132. 405 U.S. at 512.
133. Id.
134. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see also Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
135. 383 U.S. at 111.
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a rational relationship between such a classification and the purpose
of the law, MDSO's are denied equal protection of the laws when
committed by less than a unanimous jury and on a lesser standard
of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Right To Treatment-The major justification and rationaliza-
tion of MDSO commitments has been the insistence that what is
meted out is "treatment" and not punishment. Commenting on
one MDSO's objection to the fact that although he was found guilty
of a misdemeanor he now found himself in San Quentin, posi-
bly for life, the court in People v. Levy 3 ' asserted that "the pur-
pose of confinement is to protect society and to try and cure the
accused."'13 7  His confinement, the court maintained, was not for
punishment. The court failed to recognize that the twin purposes
of protection and cure may not be severed. The confinement is
real. The treatment must be more than illusory; it must exist in
fact.
In his seminal opinion, in Rouse v. Cameron,'a Chief Judge
Bazelon explored the concept of a right to treatment. Noting that
the purpose of involuntary hospitalization was treatment, not
punishment, he concluded that "(c)ontinuing failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment cannot be justified by lack of
staff or facilities."'39  The right to treatment in Rouse was based
on a statutory right similar to that which the California court rec-
ognized in Gary W."4O The MDSO statutes, as those in Gary W.,
also speak in terms of treatment. 14
The MDSO population is distributed between Atascadero
State Hospital and the general prison population. Any discussion
of the MDSO's right to treatment must therefore deal with both
milieus.
Department of Mental Hygiene-Atascadero-After a person has
been adjudicated an MDSO and found amenable to treatment he
is sent to Atascadero State Hospital which is administered by
the Department of Mental Hygiene. It is not within the scope of
136. People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957).
137. Id. at 468, 311 P.2d at 902. Accord, People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App.
2d 579, 582, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966). The Attorney General of California
has also noted that there are dual interests involved: protection and rehabilita-
tion. Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae, at 7, Murel v. Balti-
more City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (per curiam).
138. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also 60 GEO.
L.J. 225, 236-38 (1971).
139. 373 F.2d at 457.
140. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
141. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6316, 6317 (which permits the court to
request progress reports concerning the person's recovery), 6325, 6326. There
is no doubt that even under section 6326 which provides for penal commitment
a person is required to be placed in a "unit for the care and treatment" of such
offenders (emphasis added).
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this comment to attempt to deal exhaustively with the quality of
treatment at Atascadero. It is, however, highly questionable
whether even those MDSOs at Atascadero are receiving "...
such individual treatment as will give each of them a realis-
tic opportunity to be cured or to improve his . mental condi-
ion."1 42
In 1970-71 of those MDSOs to leave Atascadero, 9 were
transferred to other hospitals within the Department of Mental
Hygiene; 199 were returned to court as no longer amenable to
treatment and not dangerous (an "A" rating); and 281 were re-
turned as no longer amenable to treatment and still dangerous
(a "B" rating).143 The high number of those considered still dan-
gerous may speak for itself. It is this group which will most likely
be recertified as MDSO and indeterminately committed to a pe-
nal institution.1
4
In August, 1972 a Sexual Reorientation Program was pro-
posed for one-third of the approximately 535 MDSOs admitted
to Atascadero yearly. In the prospectus for this new program it
was mentioned that the population turns over completely within a
12 month period. The program is aimed at improving "severe
behavioral deficits in both (1) sex-related social skills, and (2)
explicit sexual skills to such an extent that they have behaved in
a manner that society refuses to support."' 5
This author cannot comment on the medical efficacy of the
proposed reorientation plan; however, it is designed to accomo-
date only one-third of those committed, and even if substan-
tially effective it would still leave a large number of those com-
mitted as MDSOs dependent on the hospital's other facilities.
If past statistics are any indication, these other "treatment" meth-
ods are not notably successful. Without effective treatment even
commitment to Atascadero becomes reduced to incarceration
for status.
Department of Corrections-the prison system-Although many
MDSOs are at Atascadero State Hospital, others are at the Cali-
fornia Medical Facility'48 or within prisons. 47  Justice Mosk in
142. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala., N.D. 1971).
143. Community Planning, Orientation and Transfer, Staff Paper, Atascadero
State Hospital, Appendix 2.
144. Cf. Id. The report considers those with "B" ratings as likely candi-
dates for jail or prison but it is difficult to tell if that refers to sentencing on
their original charge or recommitment to prison as an MDSO.
145. Sexual Reorientation Program 1, Staff Paper, Atascadero State Hos-
pital, August 1, 1972.
146. As of December 31, 1972 there were 22 MDSOs at the California
Medical Facility. Note 149 infra and accompanying text.
147. As of December 31, 1972 there were 66 MDSOs in California prisons.
Note 149 infra and accompanying text.
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In re Lynch cites to an affidavit of the assistant superintendent in
charge of psychiatric services at the Vacaville Medical Facility
who "describes the available group therapy as follows:
Such a person is placed in a group whose members suffer
from a variety of mental problems. Since some inmates tend
to look down on the exhibitionists, if such a person manages
to overcome such intimidation and function adequately in
such a masculine environment the group therapy will benefit
him.
[Justice Mosk continues to say]
"We are not told what happens to the individual who does
not 'manage to overcome' that concerted peer scorn. At best,
we suppose, he continues to serve his sentence until a new attempt
is made; at worst, we can only presume that the ordeal confirms
or even increases his prior feelings of insecurity and inadequacy.
In any event if this is the most optimistic treatment offered for
exhibitionism in the most psychiatrically oriented institution in
the Department of Corrections, the long prison sentence imposed
by section 314 can hardly be justified as an act of benevolence
towards the offender.' 148
If this is an indicia of the type of treatment offered at "the
most psychiatrically oriented institution in the Department of
Corrections" than one can only surmise that the availability of
such services are essentially nil in other prison facilities.
As of December 31, 1972 there were 88 men under the
"care" of the Department of Corrections who had been committed
under MDSO procedures. These men were housed as follows:
8 in Northern Reception-Guidance Center
6 in San Quentin
22 in California Medical Facility (Vacaville)
52 in California Men's Colony149
The 52 MDSOs at the California Men's Colony are housed inQuad "D" which holds 600 men.'5 ' Additionally, although nine
psychiatrists are available at the Men's Colony, they rarely treat
MDSOs. The totality of the MDSO's treatment consists of one,
one hour and fifteen minute group therapy session a week.'
148. 8 Cal. 3d at 434, 503 P.2d at 937, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
149. Letter from M.V. Ryan, Senior Statistician, Department of Corrections,
to the author, February 14, 1973 on file at the SANTA CLARA LAWYER.
150. Telephone interview with Mr. Wade, Information Officer at the Cal-
ifornia Men's Colony, February 13, 1973.
151. Telephone interview with Mr. Carl Weaver, Correctional Counselor,
California Men's Colony, April 25, 1973. According to this interview, in addi-
tion to the nine full-time psychiatrists who do not work with MDSOs, there are6 psychologists, 4 of whom are assigned to "D" Quad to serve its 600 men.
There are also 17 correctional counselors distributed throughout the entire
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MDSOs are, therefore, housed within the general prison
population, and receive negligible treatment which violates both
the letter and the spirit of the law.' 52
Even if the MDSO laws accomplish what the courts of
California have always claimed as their purpose-protecting
society by incarcerating suspected deviants-and even if one ac-
cepts the predictive ability of psychiatry, these commitments vi-
olate the right to treatment of every alleged MDSO. Such drastic
action is not necessary or proper, either for protection of the in-
dividual so committed, or for that of society at large. Society's in-
terests can be preserved through commitment under LPS and in-
carceration under the criminal laws, while still respecting the
fundamental rights of those affected.
MDSO-unconstitutional criminal commitment
What is an MDSO commitment and how does it differ from
a criminal commitment? The California courts have consistently
maintained that MDSO proceedings are civil in nature while rec-
ognizing that their primary function is the protection of soci-
ety,' 53 which is normally a criminal function."' A satisfactory
test for the difference between criminal and civil statutes has not
yet been announced by the Supreme Court.
In In re Gault'55 and In re Winship'56 the Court examined
the adjudicatory process and determined that the benign purpose
of juvenile courts could not mask the substantial deprivation of
rights which had often been inflicted on juveniles. The Court in
Specht v. Patterson'5 7 looked at the disposition of sexual psycho-
paths, indicating that they were subjected to "criminal punish-
ment even though it is designated not so much as retribution as
it is to keep individuals from inflicting future harm."' 58 The
Specht Court cited with approval an earlier third circuit decision
which insisted that "'a defendant in (a sexual psychopath) pro-
ceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections
which due process guarantees in criminal proceedings.' 5'
Men's Colony. The MDSO group therapy sessions consist of 10 MDSOs
(whose problems may be unrelated), 1 correctional counselor and 1 student
intern.
152. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6326 (West 1972). See note 43 supra.
153. See note 3 supra. See also In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679,
69 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968); People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P.2d
913 (1952).
154. Cf. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF T=E CRIMINAL SANCTION 25-26 (1968).
155. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
156. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
157. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
158. Id. at 608.
159. Id. at 609-10 citing Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d
Cir. 1966).
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If the test is therefore the severity of the consequences of
one affected by an allegedly civil proceeding, the MDSO laws are
clearly the type of statute to which the Gault, Winship, Specht
and Gerchman decisions were addressed. These decisions thus
require criminal due process in an MDSO commitment. The
question then becomes: which rights are not extended to a men-
tally disordered sex offender that are included in the "full pano-
ply of relevant protections"?' 10
The Standard of Proof-Criminal or Civil?-In Lessard v.
Schmidt,'61 a three-judge federal district court, recently expressed
surprise that the civil/criminal dichotomy had not been laid to
rest by Gault.62 The court in Lessard was dealing with a Wis-
consin involuntary civil commitment which did not require a crim-
inal conviction, but the contentions of the court are equally appli-
cable to MDSO proceedings.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court had approved jury instruc-
tions which permitted involuntary civil commitment based upon
a preponderance of the evidence.' 63 The MDSO statute permits
trial ". . . as provided by law for the trial of civil cases, and if
tried before a jury the person shall be discharged unless a verdict
that he is a mentally disordered sex offender is found by at least
three-fourths of the jury."16 4  Recent California appellate cases
have affirmed that the standard of proof in such trials is merely a
preponderance of the evidence. 1 5
Of particular interest in this regard is an amicus brief 66
filed in a recent United States Supreme Court case, Murel v. Balti-
more City Criminal Court'67 which challenged Maryland's De-
fective Delinquency Law.168 After briefing and oral argument the
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
The Attorney General of California filed a brief as amicus
curiae in support of the State of Maryland. In his statement of in-
160. Id. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
161. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
162. Id. at 1088,
163. Id. at 1094 citing In re Hogan, 232 Wis. 521, 287 N.W. 725 (1939).
164. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6321 (West 1972).
165. People v. Burnick, 27 Cal. App. 3d 326, 103 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1972)
hearing granted, Crim. No. 16554, Oct. 12, 1972, argued Jan. 11, 1973; People
v. Bonneville, 29 Cal. App. 3d 317, 105 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1972) hearing granted,
Crim. No. 16777, March 1, 1973.
166. Brief for The State of California as Amicus Curiae, Murel v. Baltimore
City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (per curiam) [hereinafter cited as
AMIcus BRIEF].
167. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (per
curiam). See Comment, An End To Incompetency To Stand Trial, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 560, 570 (1973).
168. MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 31B § 5 (1972).
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terest, 169 the Attorney General noted the similarity between the
Maryland statute in question and California's MDSO provisions.
The amicus brief addressed itself to two questions: (1) the
"civil" character of the Defective Delinquent Act and (2) the
statute's standard of proof: a preponderance of the evidence.
The State of California argued that the reasonable doubt standard
is "peculiarly applicable to criminal cases where the issue is guilt
or innocence.' 170  By asserting that these proceedings "do not in-
volve a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence with
respect to a criminal charge, '1 7' the Attorney General concluded
that the proper standard of proof was a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
The Attorney General argued that the underlying subject of
the proceeding was not a crime, which requires a unity of act and
intent, but status, which requires only the requisite state of mind
and probability of future action. However, the cases discussed
earlier make it clear that a proceeding is criminal when its purpose
is the protection of society by the incarceration (commitment)
of the individual. That which is to be determined-guilt versus
status-does not define the proceeding. Rather, it is the conse-
quences to the accused that control. Our laws prohibit criminal
incarceration of an individual except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the commission of certain proscribed acts.
"Guilt" may be adjudged under the MDSO statute upon a
finding of predisposition to the commission of sexual offenses
although no overt sexual offense has been charged.17 1 It is the
determination of this predisposition (state of mind) coupled with
an evaluation of the alleged MDSO's potential dangerousness
that is presented to the jury. 173  In a normal criminal case
each element of the unity of act and intent must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Often intent may be inferred from
the commission and proof of an act. Yet state of mind or predis-
position is undoubtedly harder to prove than the commission of
an act. It is anomolous to argue that the elimination of one of
these two elements should lower the standard of proof required
for the other. Quite the opposite should be true. If a jury is be-
ing asked to predict behavior rather than judge if it has, in fact,
occurred, then the standard of proof should be at least as high as
if the act had allegedly occurred, i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt.
169. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 42, 28 U.S.C.A.
170. AMIcus BRiEF at 9.
171. Id.
172. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6302 (West 1972) merely requires con-
viction of any criminal act. It is not necessary that it have a sexual connota-
tion.
173. Id. § 6321.
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In other areas the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has been extended to "civil" proceedings. In re Win-
ship"4 extended that standard to juvenile proceedings. 175  The
"civil" nomenclature of juvenile proceedings is similar to that of
MDSO actions. Amicus curiae in Murel contended that Win-
ship was "a proceeding essentially criminal in nature" and that
the application of the reasonable doubt standard to juveniles
merely applies criminal procedures long applied in other "es-
sentially criminal" arenas. 176  However, the amicus fails to recog-
nize that although a juvenile petition sets out the violations of law
which allegedly compose a child's delinquency, the final adjudica-
tion is technically upon the delinquent or non-delinquent status
of the child, just as a mentally disordered sex offender's trial de-
termines his status. 77
Amicus curiae further asserts that proof by a preponder-
ance of evidence is sufficient because all that the jury is asked todo is to confirm a psychiatric diagnosis."17 This statement ishighly revealing. The traditional function of a jury, civil or
criminal, is to weigh the evidence and reach its own conclusion.
If the purpose of the jury safeguard presently afforded by the
MDSO statute 79 is nothing more than to rubber-stamp thepsychiatric opinion presented, the safeguard is now a meaning-
less sham and the burden of proof irrelevant, since nothing isproved. The Attorney General also argues that a higher standard
of proof will impose a substantial burden upon commitment pro-
ceedings.' 0 Amicus is probably correct in its assumption that
a higher standard of proof places some burden on the state. We
have long believed in criminal prosecutions that this burden is
trivial when compared to an individual's fundamental interest in
his liberty.
Murel was not decided on its merits, but the California Su-
preme Court is currently considering the same issues. People v.
174. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
175. For a thorough analysis of the analogy between juvenile (Winship) and
MDSO proceedings see Comment, supra note 16, at 174-78.
176. AMicus BRIEF at 10-11.
177. Comment, supra note 16, at 176.
178. AMicus BRIEF at 13. See Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process:A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 29 (Feb./March 1968). ProfessorDershowitz broadly describes the problem he sees in the area of involuntary
civil commitment where the medical model has overtaken and usurped the func-
tion of the legal model. He points out that what few studies have been under-taken reveal that psychiatrists are poor predictors of anti-social conduct andthat they tend to overpredict such conduct where, in fact, it would not occur.
179. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6321 (West 1972).
180. AMIcus BRIEF at 13.
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Burnick' s' was recently argued before the court and People v.
Bonneville" 2 has been granted a hearing. Both Burnick and
Bonneville involve appellants who were adjudicated MDSOs based
on a preponderance of the evidence. Both cases were argued on
the basis of the Winship analogy' to juvenile proceedings. Ad-
ditionally, Bonneville raises the issue of equal protection of the
laws.18 4
The lower court in Burnick gave only cursory treatment
to the standard of proof question, considering the proper analogy
to be to narcotics commitments." 5 The Bonneville court re-
fused, in the absence of a specific higher court ruling, to declare
invalid a legislative decision "'clothed with the presumption
of constitutionality.' "I" It also emphasized, as did the amicus
brief in Murel, that a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would "'foreclose the realistic use of medical testimony at crimi-
nal trials.' "1187 The court seems confused; the burden of proof
"at criminal trials" is already beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
burden does not shift with the nature of the testimony presented.
As with any evidence, the jury weighs the likelihood of certain-
ty and arrives at its verdict. An alleged MDSO is already af-
forded the right to confront, cross-examine and present witnesses.
If these rights are not to be rendered meaningless the jury func-
tion must be more than a rubber-stamp. The Bonneville court
may simply be acknowledging the inherent imprecision of psychi-
atric diagnosis, but the failures of that profession should not be
imposed upon the diagnostic subject."88
181. 27 Cal. App. 3d 326, 103 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1972) hearing granted,
Crim. No. 16554, Oct. 12, 1972, argued Jan. 11, 1973. The appellate court
had held Burnick's commitment invalid because two court-appointed psychia-
trists were not present during the entire hearing pursuant to Section 6308.
A retrial was ordered utilizing a preponderance of evidence standard.
182. 29 Cal. App. 3d 317, 105 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1972), hearing granted, Crim.
No. 16777, March 1, 1973.
183. Brief for Appellant at 8-10, People v. Burnick, 29 Cal. App. 3d at
320-23, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 557-61.
184. See notes 121-135 supra and accompanying text.
185. People v. Valdez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 895, 67 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1968).
The Burnick court found Valdez controlling. The Valdez court held narcotic
commitment proceedings to be "civil", "nonpunitive" and "remedial". However
the court did note that "[a] situation may well arise where such characterization
may break down in the face of the reality of the addict's involuntary confine-
ment." Id. at 904, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
186. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 559, citing Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 484, 171 P.2d 21, 23 (1946).
187. Id. at 325, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 561 citing People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d
574, 579, n.2, 414 P.2d 353, 357-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229-30 (1966) (emphasis
by the Bonneville court).
188. Consider for example the court's observation in People v. Bennett, 245
Cal. App. 2d 10, 53 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1966), where the defendant was contesting
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The costs of such an imposition are clear. An adjudicated
MDSO loses several fundamental rights and is stigmatized even
after his release. 189  These rights should not be lost "'upon no
higher degree of proof than applies in a negligence case.' "190
The argument for a stringent standard of proof is more
compelling in the case of a civil commitment in which an
individual will be deprived of basic civil rights and be cer-
tainly stigmatized by the lack of confidentiality of the adju-
dication. [The Lessard court therefore held] that the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to
show that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous.' 9'
Punishment for Status-Cruel and Unusual?-The United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California'92 recognized the con-
cept that a person may not be imprisoned as a criminal for an ill-
ness, in that case, addiction to narcotics.' The California Su-
preme Court in its discussion of "status" in In re Gary W.'94 sur-
veyed the legislative language which provided for an extension of
commitment for juveniles.' 95 Like the statute in Gary W. the
his recommitment based solely upon the recommendation of the superintendent
of Atascadero:
... by augmenting the record on this appeal, appellant has presented
to us a letter written after the hearing held herein by a clinical psy-
chologist at the hospital who claimed that appellant had been her pa-
tient while at the hospital. Her report on his activities and his progress
was diametrically opposed to the conclusion reached by the superin-
tendent. No reason is given why this information was not obtainedprior to the hearing or why this psychologist had not been called as a
witness on appellant's behalf. Id. at 26. (footnotes omitted)
189. Not only can one lose various civil rights while incarcerated as anMDSO but the stigma of being thus adjudicated lingers on. The Penal Code
requires that "any person who . . . is determined to be a mentally disordered
sex offender . . . shall within 30 days of his coming into any county or city
. . . in which he resides or is temporarily domiciled for such a length of time
register with the chief of police of the city in which he resides. . . ." CAL.
PEN. CODE § 290 (West 1972). Section 290.5 provides for relief from the duty
to register upon the granting of a certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to Sec-
tion 4852.01 of the Penal Code. The latter section, however, applies only to
the commission of felonies leaving the misdemeanant-MDSO without a remedy.See also 52 Op. Att'y Gen. 118 (1969) in which Section 1203.4 of the Penal
Code (release from disabilities and penalties of crime or offense after successful
completion of probation) is held applicable to criminal convictions but not
to "civil" MDSO proceedings.
190. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1972) citing
Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
191. 349 F. Supp. at 1095.
192. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961). In the recent case of
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1971), the Court af-
firmed that a person afflicted with mental illness could not be imprisoned for a
willful criminal act (in this case civil contempt) if the act was "a manifestation
of mental illness, for which he cannot fairly be held responsible." Id. at 251.
See Comment, supra note 167 at 569.
193. 370 U.S. at 667.
194. 5 Cal. 3d at 301, 486 P.2d at 1205, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
195. See notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text.
1973] CALIFORNIA'S MDSO LAWS
MDSO laws provide for treatment for some, but not all, "sex of-
fenders."'19 6
The MDSO statute provides that those MDSOs who are not
amenable to treatment may be returned to the court in which they
were originally tried, recertified to superior court, and committed
for an indeterminate period to a penal institution. 19 7  This is in-
deed imprisonment for status. By definition they will not benefit
from treatment' 98 and by experience they are mixed with the
general prison population.'99
The court in Gary W. announced two criteria for rejecting
the status argument: 1) there was no evidence that persons so
committed were included among the general prison population,
and; 2) there was no evidence that they were confined without
treatment.200  Justice Stewart in Robinson considered imprison-
ment predicated on illness for even one day to be cruel and unus-
ual.2 ' In the case of MDSOs recertified into the prison system all
of the elements required in Gary W. are clearly present. For the
MDSO committed on an indeterminate sentence and placed by
the Department of Mental Hygiene within a facility of the De-
partment of Corrections, the imprisonment may well be for life.
Although the statute calls for periodic review, the hearing is not
mandatory 2°2 and is held before the same judge who originally is-
196. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6316, 6326 (West 1972). A person
may be adjudged not amenable to treatment either before or after spending
time at Atascadero.
197. Id. § 6316. See note 19 supra for text of § 6316.
198. They will, after all, "not benefit by care or treatment in a state hos-
pital.... CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6316 (West 1972).
199. See notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text. The courts have long
acknowledged that MDSOs are confined within the general prison population.
This type of penal commitment has been recognized in People v. Levy, 151 Cal.
App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 867 (1957); People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579,
49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966); In re Bevill, 68 Cal. 2d 854, 442 P.2d 679, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1968).
200. See notes 72-75 supra and accompanying text.
201. 370 U.S. at 667.
202. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 6327 (West 1972) provides in part:
After a person has been committed for an indeterminate period to
the department for placement in a state hospital as a mentally disor-
dered sex offender and has been confined for a period of not less than
six months from the date of the order of commitment, the commit-
ting court may upon its own motion or on motion by or on behalf of
the person committed, require the superintendent of the state hospital
to which the person was committed to forward to the committing
court, within 30 days, his opinion under (a) or (b) of Section 6325,
including therein a report, diagnosis and recommendation concerning
the person's future care, supervision, or treatment. After receipt of
the report, the committing court may order the return of the person to
the court for a hearing as to whether the person is still a mentally
disordered sex offender within the meaning of this article.
(emphasis added). In In re Martinez, 130 Cal. App. 2d 239, 278 P.2d 727
(1955) the court read the "may" to be completely discretionary, regardless of
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sued the commitment.2"3 Unlike a person under criminal sentence,
the MDSO gets no parole date; he is not a "time server," but
merely a custody case.214  In reality, for him, the sentence may be
endless. Under the criteria of Robinson and Gary W. this dis-
position constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.20
As early as 1966 the appellate court in People v. Rancier °6
noted that if an MDSO's confinement had "external criminal in-
dicia" which outweighed the "civil purpose, mechanism, and op-
eration of the program set forth in the statutes," this could well
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Robinson.20 7  To
be mixed within the prison population, receiving little or no "care
and treatment," meets the test of "external criminal indicia."
Given the discussion of status in Gary W. and the clear evi-
dence that MDSOs committed within the penal system are mixed
with the general prison population and receive virtually no treat-
ment, whatever is left of the "civil" facade vanishes. Clearly,
penal commitment under the MDSO laws is unconstitutional as it
imprisons for status and as such constitutes cruel and unusal
punishment in violation of the California and United States Con-
stitutions.
IV. THE FUTURE PERSPECTIVE
The mentally disordered sex offender laws, whether viewed
as civil or criminal, fail to meet constitutional requirements. As
such they should be declared unconstitutional.
the sufficiency of the showing. This makes the required showing of "abuse"
by the lower court practically impossible to prove on appeal.
203. Id. § 6327.
204. CHAPMAN, supra note 114.
205. In light of these cases, the case of People v. Thomas, 260 Cal. App. 2d
196, 67 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1968), is clearly erroneous in concluding that such a
commitment does not impose cruel and unusual punishment. Even while hold-
ing this, that court recognized that
[clonfinement indefinitely in a facility located in a prison after a de-termination that a mentally disordered sex offender will not benefitfrom further hospital treatment is a drastic form of confinement.
Id. at 202.
206. People v. Rancier, 240 Cal. App. 2d 579, 49 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1966).
Rancier was convicted initially of violation of Penal Code section 647a(1)(lewd or disorderly conduct in public) a misdemeanor punishable by a maximumjail sentence of six months or a fine not exceeding $500, or both. After
spending one year at Atascadero he was designated as still dangerous but not
amenable to treatment. After various certifications and recertifications he was
sent to the California Medical Facility at Vacaville and then to the California
Men's Colony at Los Padres. The court in Rancier refused to view this com-
mitment as akin to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The case,
however, at least signifies an awareness of the potential for abuse within the
realities of the present system.
207. Id. at 585, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
CA LIFORNIA'S MDSO LA WS
Considered as a purely civil commitment, the statutes fail to
provide equal protection of the laws because they do not require
the due process protections of other involuntary commitment
procedures. It is also clear that the "treatment" provided
MDSOs, especially those confined in prisons, cannot withstand
the scrutiny of recent right to treatment cases, including the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's analysis in In re Gary W.
Viewed as criminal statutes, MDSO laws must also fail. They
utilize a civil standard of proof, less than a unanimous jury and
punish for what can only be described as status. Additionally,
the length of the possible punishment, which by statute is "inde-
terminate," may be for life. In light of the criteria of In re Lynch
this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
It is incumbent upon the court to recognize these inequities
and act upon them, particularly as the legislature has been thwarted
in its attempt to do so. A recent bill overwhelmingly passed by
both houses of the legislature 08 would have limited the length of
penal confinement to "a period not to exceed the maximum sen-
tence prescribed by law for the offense of which the person was
.convicted. 20 9  The legislature has thus recognized the inequities
associated with a possible life sentence in prison based upon a
"civil" commitment, while at the same time recognizing society's
right to protection. This legislative attempt at correction is
praiseworthy, but it does not go far enough.
The unconstitutionality of the MDSO laws reaches beyond the
area of penal confinement. It is time to reconsider the philo-
sophical underpinnings of these laws and to ask if it is the right
or purpose of the law to commit (imprison) people for possible
future actions. What began as a benevolent attempt to aid the
sex offender has itself become perverted.
We have come full circle; the Janus faces of the MDSO
commitment are readily apparent and cannot be reconciled. There
is an invidious dichotomy between the criminal and civil appella-
208. Assembly Bill No. 1187, Introduced by Assemblyman John J. Miller,
March 14, 1972, Passed 56-2 in the Assembly; unanimously by the Senate; re-
turned unsigned by the Governor. In a digest of the bill put out by Assembly-
man Miller's office, its purpose was characterized as
intended to limit the maximum duration of such commitments to the
maximum sentence prescribed for the offense of which the offender
was convicted. If, during such confinement, the offender does not
respond to treatment and is deemed a danger to others, the bill re-
quires that he be cared for pursuant to the provisions of the L-P-S
Act, i.e. conservatorship established, 72-hour evaluation, followed by a
14 day intensive treatment program and if following such evaluation
and treatment he is deemed a potential danger to others he may be
committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene or to a county facil-
ity for 90 day periods of involuntary treatment.
209. Id. at 2.
1973]
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tions. More importantly, what began as an attempt to hu-
manize the law and provide "curative" therapy for sex offenders
has become a method for preventive detention, without treatment
and without hope. The California Supreme Court should thus
take the opportunity presented by the cases before it to abolish
MDSO commitments.21 0
Susan G. Tanenbaum
210. In addition to the Burnick and Bonneville cases, the court has also
granted a hearing in an unreported case, People v. Feagley, Crim. No. 16818.
In 1970, after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, Mr. Feagley was sent to Atas-
cadero. In return for his plea, there was an informal agreement with the dis-
trict attorney that if he was found not amenable to treatment he would be
sentenced on his original charge. When he was subsequently found not amen-
able to treatment and returned to court, he was recertified MDSO and com-
mitted to the California Men's Colony. (This case antedates People v. West,
3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970) which required the re-
cording of plea bargains.) He was recently transferred back to Atascadero.
Telephone Interview with Stephen L. Katz, Attorney for Mr. Feagley, April 26,
1973.
